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Abstract. R. Lavi and C. Swamy (FOCS 2005, J. ACM 2011) introduced a general method
for obtaining truthful-in-expectation mechanisms from linear programming based approxi-
mation algorithms. Due to the use of the Ellipsoid method, a direct implementation of the
method is unlikely to be efficient in practice. We propose to use the much simpler and usu-
ally faster multiplicative weights update method instead. The simplification comes at the
cost of slightly weaker approximation and truthfulness guarantees.
1 Introduction
Algorithmic mechanism design is the art of designing and implementing the rules of a game to
achieve a desired outcome from a set of possible outcomes. Each player (agent) has a valuation that
assigns a value to each possible outcome. The desired outcome is the one that maximizes the sum
of the valuations; this sum is usually called social welfare. The players are assumed to be selfish:
they report valuations to the mechanism, which may differ from the true valuations. Players may
lie about their valuations in order to direct the mechanism into an outcome favorable to them.
The mechanism computes an outcome and payments for the players. The utility of a player is
her/his value of the outcome computed by the mechanism minus her/his payment charged by
the mechanism. The agents are interested in optimizing their personal utility. Social welfare and
personal utilities are determined with respect to the true valuations of the players, although they
are not public knowledge. The purpose of the payments is to incentivize the players to report their
true valuations. A mechanism is truthful if reporting the truth is a best strategy for each player
irrespective of the inputs provided by the other players. A mechanism is efficient if the outcome
and the payments can be computed in polynomial time. The underlying optimization problem is
the computation of an outcome maximizing social welfare given the valutions of the players.
If the underlying optimization problem can be efficiently solved to optimality, the celebrated
VCG mechanism (see, e.g., [NRTV07]) achieves truthfulness, social welfare optimization, and
polynomial running time. The computation of the outcome and the computation of the payments
requires to solve the underlying optimization problem to optimality.
Many optimization problems are NP-hard and hence are unlikely to have an exact algorithm
with polynomial running time. However, it might be possible to solve the problem approximately
in polynomial running time.
An example is the combinatorial auction problem. There is a set of m items to be sold to a set
of n players. The (reported) value of a set S of items to the i-th player is vi(S) with vi(∅) = 0 and
vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . Let xi,S be a 0-1 variable indicating that set S is given to player i.
Then
∑
S xi,S ≤ 1 for every player i as at most one set can be given to i, and
∑
i
∑
S;j∈S xi,S ≤ 1
for every item j as any item can be given away only once. The social welfare is
∑
i,S vi(S)xi,S .
The linear programming relaxation is obtained by replacing the integrality constraints for xi,s by
0 ≤ xi,S ≤ 1. Note that the number d of variables is exponential in the number of items, namely
d = n2m. The linear program is of the packing type, i.e., if x is feasible and y ≤ x, then y is
feasible. For the combinatorial auction problem, O(
√
n)-approximation algorithms exist and these
⋆ A preliminary version of these results was presented at SAGT 2015 [EMR15].
algorithms also provide the corresponding integrality-gap-verifier (the definition is given below)
with α = 1/
√
n ([BKV05,KS98,Rag88]).
For many integer linear programming problems, approximation algorithms are known that
first solve the corresponding linear programming relaxation and then construct an integral solution
either by rounding or by primal-dual methods. Lavi and Swamy ([LS05,LS11]) showed that certain
linear programming based approximation algorithms for the social welfare problem can be turned
into randomized mechanisms that are truthful-in-expectation, i.e., reporting the truth maximizes
the expected utility of a player. The LS-mechanism is powerful (see [LS05,LS11,CEF10,HKV11]
for applications), but unlikely to be efficient in practice because of its use of the Ellipsoid method.
We show how to use the multiplicative weights update method instead. This results in simpler
algorithms at the cost of somewhat weaker approximation and truthfulness guarantees.
We next review the LS-mechanism. It applies to integer linear programming problems of the
packing type for which the linear programming relaxation can be solved exactly and for which an
α-integrality gap verifier is available. More precisely:
1. Let Q ⊆ Rd≥0 be a packing polytope, i.e., Q is a bounded convex polytope contained in the
non-negative orthant of d-dimensional space with the property that if y ∈ Q and x ≤ y then
x ∈ Q. The linear programming problem for Q asks to find for a given d-dimensional vector v
a point x∗ = argmaxx∈Q v
Tx.
2. We use QI := Q ∩ Zd for the set of integral points in Q. The integer linear programming
problem for QI asks to find for a given d-dimensional vector v a point x∗ = argmaxx∈QI vTx.
We use x1, x2, . . . , xj , . . . to denote the elements of QI and N for the index set of all elements
in QI .
3. An α-integrality-gap-verifier for QI for some α ∈ (0, 1] is an efficient algorithm that on input
v ∈ Rd and x∗ ∈ Q, returns an x ∈ QI such that
vTx ≥ αvTx∗.
The mechanism consists of three main steps:
1. Let vi ∈ Rd≥0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be the reported valuation of the i-th player and let v =
∑
i vi
be the accumulated reported valuation. Solve the LP-relaxation, i.e., find a maximizer x∗ =
argmaxx∈Q v
Tx for the social welfare of the fractional problem, and determine the VCG prices4
p1, . . . , pn. The allocation x
∗ and the VCG-prices are a truthful mechanism for the fractional
problem.
2. Write α · x∗ as a convex combination of integral solutions in Q, i.e., α · x∗ = ∑j∈N λjxj ,
λj ≥ 0,
∑
j∈N λj = 1, and x
j ∈ QI . This step requires the α-integrality-gap-verifier.
3. Pick the integral solution xj with probability λj , and charge the i-th player the price pi ·
(vTi x
j/vTi x
∗). If vTi x
∗ = 0, charge zero.
The LS-mechanism approximates social welfare with factor α (is α-socially efficient) and guar-
antees truthfulness-in-expectation, i.e., it converts a truthful fractional mechanism into an α-
approximate truthful-in-expectation integral mechanism. With respect to practical applicability,
steps 1 and 2 are the two major bottlenecks. Step 1 requires solving n + 1 linear programs, one
for the fractional solution and one for each price; an exact solution requires the use of the Ellip-
soid method (see e.g. [GLS88]), if the dimension is exponential. Furthermore, up to recently, the
only method known to perform the decomposition in Step 2 is through the Ellipsoid method. An
alternative method avoiding the use of the Ellipsoid method was recently given by Kraft, Fadaei,
and Bichler [KFB14]. We comment on their result in the next section.
1.1 Our Results
Our result concerns the design and analysis of a practical algorithm for the LS-scheme. We first
consider the case where the LP-relaxation of SWM (social welfare maximization) in Step 1 of the
4 pi =
∑
j 6=i v
T
j (xˆ− x
∗), where xˆ = argmaxx∈Q
∑
j 6=i v
T
j x.
2
LS-scheme can be solved exactly and efficiently and then our problem reduces to the design of a
practical algorithm for Step 2. Afterwards, we consider the more general problem where only an
FPTAS for the LP-relaxation is available.
Convex Decomposition. Over the past 15 years, simple and fast methods have been developed
for solving packing and covering linear programs [BI06,GK95,GK07,Kha04,KY07,PST91,You01]
within an arbitrarily small error guarantee ε. These methods are based on the multiplicative
weights update (MWU) method [AHK12], in which a very simple update rule is repeatedly per-
formed until a near-optimal solution is obtained. We show how to replace the use of the Ellipsoid
method in Step 2 by an approximation algorithm for covering linear programs. This result is the
topic of Section 2.
Theorem 1. Let ε > 0 be arbitrary. Given a fractional point x∗ ∈ Q, and an α-integrality-gap
verifier for QI, we can find a convex decomposition
α
1 + 4ε
· x∗ =
∑
j∈N
λjx
j .
The convex decomposition has size (= number of nonzero λj) at most s(1 + ⌈ε−2 ln s⌉), where s
is the size of the support of x∗ (= number of nonzero components). The algorithm makes at most
s⌈ε−2 ln s⌉ calls to the integrality-gap-verifier.
Kraft, Fadaei, and Bichler [KFB14] obtained a related result independently. However, their con-
struction is less efficient in two aspects. First, it requires O(s2ε−2) calls of the integrality-gap-
verifyer. Second, the size of their convex decomposition might be as large as O(s3ε−2). In the
combinatorial auction problem, s = n + m. Theorem 1 together with Steps 1 and 3 of the LS
scheme implies a mechanism that is truthful-in-expectation and has (α/(1 + 4ε))-social efficiency.
We leave it as an open problem whether the quadratic dependency of the size of the decom-
position on ε can be improved5.
Approximately Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanism. We drop the assumption that the fractional
SWM-problem can be solved optimally and assume instead that we have an FPTAS for it. We
assume further that the problem is separable, which means that the variables can be partitioned
into disjoint groups, one for each player, such that the value of an allocation for a player depends
only on the variables in his group, i.e,
vi(x) = vi(xi),
where xi is the set of variables associated
6 with player i. Formally, any outcome x ∈ Q ⊆ Rd can
be written as x = (x1, . . . , xn) where xi ∈ Rdi and d = d1 + . . .+ dn. We further assume that for
each player i ∈ [n], there is a dominating allocation ui ∈ Q that maximizes his value for every
valuation vi, i.e.,
vi(u
i) = max
z∈Q
vi(z), (1)
for every vi ∈ Vi, where Vi denotes the possible valuations of player i. For the case of a combina-
torial auction, the allocation ui allocates all items to player i.
Theorem 2. Let ε0 ∈ (0, 1/2]. Define ε = Θ( ε
5
0
n4 ). Assuming that the fractional SWM-problem
has an FPTAS, is separable, and has a dominant allocation for every player i, and that there is an
α-integrality gap verifier for QI, there is a polynomial time randomized integral mechanism with
the following properties:
5 We remark that recent progress [ZO15,WRM15] on solving LPs of the packing/covering type has resulted
in an almost linear dependence of the running time on 1
ε
. However, the current methods do not work
in the oracle model and hence cannot be directly applied in our setting.
6 In the combinatorial auction problem, xi comprises all variables xi,S. The value of an allocation x for
player i is given by
∑
S
vi(S)xi,S.
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(C1) No positive transfer, i.e., prices are nonnegative.
(C2) Individually rational with probability 1−ε0, i.e., i.e., the utility of any truth-telling player
is non-negative with probability at least 1− ε0.
(C3) (1− ε0)-truthful-in-expectation, i.e., reporting the truth maximizes the expected utility of
a player up to a factor 1− ε0.
(C4) γ-socially efficient, where γ = α(1 − ε)(1− ε0)/(1 + 4ε).
Our mechanism is based on constructing a randomized fractional mechanism with properties
(C1) to (C3) and being (1−ε)(1−ε0)-socially efficient and then converting the mechanism into an
integral mechanism with the properties above. The conversion is simple. Let us assume that x is a
fractional allocation obtained from the fractional mechanism. We apply our convex decomposition
technique and Step 3 of the Lavi-Swamy mechanism to obtain an integral randomized mechanism
that satisfies (C1) to (C4).We show this result in Section 3.
Our fractional mechanism refines the one given in [DRVY11], where the dependency of ε on n
and ε0 is as ε = Θ(ε0/n
9). A recent experimental study of our mechanism on Display Ad Auctions
[EJ15] shows the applicability of our techniques in practice.
We leave it as an open problem whether the dependency of ε on ε0 and n can be improved.
On the Existence of an FPTAS for the Fractional SWM-Problem. We close the survey of our
results with a comment on the existence of an FPTAS for the fractional SWM-problem. Consider
a packing linear program
max cTx subject to Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0,
where A ∈ Rm×n≥0 is an m × n matrix with non-negative entries and c ∈ Rn>0, b ∈ Rm>0 are
positive vectors. We may assume that each column of A contains a non-zero entry as otherwise
the problem is trivially unbounded. For every κ ≥ 1 and weight vector z ∈ Rm≥0, let Oκ(z) denote
a κ-approximation oracle that returns a j such that
1
cj
m∑
i=1
ziaij
bi
≤ κ · min
j′∈[n]
1
cj′
m∑
i=1
ziaij′
bi
.
Garg and Ko¨nemann [GK07] presented an algorithm that uses the oracle Oκ to construct an
approximation with a factor arbitrarily close to 1/κ. For κ = 1, their algorithm is an FPTAS.
What is the approximation oracle in case of the combinatorial auction problem? In this problem,
we have one constraint for each player and one constraint for each item. Let yi ≥ 0 be the weight
for agent i and zj ≥ 0 be the weight for item j. Then oracle O1(y, z) requires to find the pair
(i, S) := argmin(k,T )
1
vk(T )
yk +∑
j∈T
zj
 .
In other words, for each k, one needs to find the set T which minimizes (yk +
∑
j∈T zj)/vk(T ). If
yk is interpreted as a fixed cost incurred by agent k and zj as the cost of item j, then T is the set
that minimizes the ratio of cost relative to value. For a simple-minded bidder who is interested
in the items in a subset T0 and no other item, i.e., vk(T ) = vk(T0) if T0 ⊆ T and vk(T ) = 0,
otherwise, T0 is the minimizer. Another simple case is additive valuations, i.e., vk(T ) =
∑
j∈T a
k
j ,
where akj ≥ 0 is the value of item j for agent k. In this situation, 1vk(T )
(
yk +
∑
j∈T zj
)
≤ β for a
set T and a positive real β if and only if
∑
j∈T (βa
k
j − zj) ≥ yk and hence the minimal β for which
such a set T exists is readily determined by binary search on β.
2 A Fast Algorithm for Convex Decompositions
Let x∗ ∈ Q be arbitrary. Carr and Vempala [CV02] showed how to construct a convex combination
of points in QI dominating αx∗ using a polynomial number of calls to an α-integrality-gap-verifier
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for QI . Lavi and Swamy [LS11] modified the construction to get an exact convex decomposition
αx∗ =
∑
i∈N λix
i for the case of packing linear programs. The construction uses the Ellipsoid
method. We show an approximate version that replaces the use of the Ellipsoid method by the
multiplicative weights update (MWU) method. For any ε > 0, we show how to obtain a convex
decomposition of αx∗/(1 + ε). Let s be the number of non-zero components of x∗. The size of the
decomposition and the number of calls to the α-integrality gap verifier are O(sε−2 ln s).
This section is structured as follows. We first review Khandekar’s FPTAS for covering linear
programs (Subsection 2.1). We then use it and the α-integrality gap verifier to construct, on input
x∗ ∈ Q, a dominating convex combination for αx∗/(1 + 4ε) (Subsection 2.2). In Subsection 2.3,
we show how to convert a dominating convex combination into an exact convex decomposition.
Finally, in Subsection 2.4, we put the pieces together.
2.1 Khandekar’s Algorithm for Covering Linear Programs
Consider a covering linear program:
min cTx subject to Ax ≥ b, x ≥ 0, (2)
where A ∈ Rm×n≥0 is an m × n matrix with non-negative entries and c ∈ Rn≥0 and b ∈ Rm≥0 are
non-negative vectors. We assume the availability of a κ-approximation oracle for some κ ∈ (0, 1].
Oκ(z): Given z ∈ Rm≥0, the oracle finds a column j of A that maximizes 1cj
∑m
i=1
ziaij
bi
within a
factor of κ:
1
cj
m∑
i=1
ziaij
bi
≥ κ · max
j′∈[n]
1
cj′
m∑
i=1
ziaij′
bi
For an exact oracle κ = 1, Khandekar [Kha04] gave an algorithm which computes a feasible
solution xˆ to (2) such that cT xˆ ≤ (1 + 4ε)z∗ where z∗ is the value of an optimal solution. The
algorithm makes O(mε−2 logm) calls to the oracle, where m is the number of rows in A. There
are algorithms predating Khandekar’s work, see, for example, [K9¨7, Chapter 4]
Theorem 3 (Generalization of Khandekar’s algorithm to arbitrary κ ≤ 1). Let ε ∈ (0, 12 ]
and let z∗ be the value of an optimum solution to (2). Procedure Covering(Oκ) (see Algorithm 3
in Appendix I) terminates in at most m⌈ε−2 lnm⌉ iterations with a feasible solution xˆ of (2) of at
most m⌈ε−2 lnm⌉ positive components. At termination, it holds that
cT xˆ ≤ (1 + 4ε)
κ
z∗. (3)
For completeness, we give a proof of Khandekar’s result in Appendix I. The proof of Theorem
3 can be modified to give (see Appendix I):
Corollary 1. Suppose b = 1, c = 1, and we use the following oracle O′ instead of O in Algorithm
3:
O′(z): Given z ∈ Rm≥0, such that 1T z = 1, the oracle finds a column j of A such that zTA1j ≥ 1.
Then the algorithm terminates in at most m⌈ε−2 lnm⌉ iterations with a feasible solution xˆ having
at most m⌈ε−2 lnm⌉ positive components, such that 1T xˆ ≤ 1 + 4ε.
2.2 Finding a Dominating Convex Combination
Recall that we use N to index the elements in QI . We assume the availability of an α-integrality-
gap-verifier F for QI . We will use the results of the preceding section and show how to obtain for
any x∗ ∈ Q and any positive ε a convex composition of points in QI that covers αx∗/(1 + 4ε).
Our algorithm requires O(sε−2 ln s) calls to the oracle, where s is size of the support of x∗.
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Theorem 4. Let ε > 0 be arbitrary. Given a fractional point x∗ ∈ Q and an α-integrality-gap
verifier F for QI, we can find a convex combination x¯ of integral points in QI such that
α
1 + 4ε
· x∗ ≤ x¯ =
∑
i∈N
λix
i.
The convex decomposition has size at most s⌈ε−2 ln s⌉, where s is the number of positive entries
of x∗. The algorithm makes at most s⌈ε−2 ln s⌉ calls to the integrality-gap verifier.
Proof. The task of finding the multipliers λi is naturally formulated as a covering LP ([CV02]),
namely,
min
∑
i∈N
λi (4)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
λix
i
j ≥ α · x∗j for all j,∑
i∈N
λi ≥ 1, λi ≥ 0.
λi ≥ 0.
Clearly, we can restrict our attention to the j ∈ S+ := {j : x∗j > 0} and rewrite the constraint for
j ∈ S+ as∑i∈N λixij/(α ·x∗j ) ≥ 1. For simplicity of notation, we assume S+ = [1..s]. We thus have
a covering linear program as in (2) with m := s+ 1 constraints, n := |N | variables λi, right-hand
side b := 1, cost vector c := 1, and constraint matrix A = (aj,i) (note that we use j for the row
index and i for the column index), where
aj,i :=
{
xij/(αx
∗
j ) 1 ≤ j ≤ s, i ∈ N
1 j = s+ 1, i ∈ N
Thus we can apply Corollary 1 of Section 2.1, provided we can efficiently implement the required
oracle O′. We do so using F .
Oracle O′ has is given a z˜) such that 1T z˜ = 1. Let us conveniently write z˜ = (w, z), where
w ∈ Rs≥0, z ∈ R≥0, and
∑j=1
j=s wj+z = 1. Oracle O′ needs to find a column i such that z˜TA1i ≥ 1.
In our case z˜TA1i =
∑s
j=1 wjx
i
j/αx
∗
j +z, and we need to find a column i for which this expression
is at least one. Since z does not depend on i, we concentrate on the first term. Define
Vj :=
{
wj
αx∗
j
for j ∈ S+
0 otherwise.
Call algorithm F with x∗ ∈ Q and V := (V1, . . .). F returns an integer solution xi ∈ QI such that∑
j∈S+
wj
αx∗j
xij = V
Txi ≥ α · V Tx∗ =
∑
j∈S+
wj ,
and hence, ∑
j∈S+
wj
αx∗j
xij + z ≥
∑
j∈S+
wj + z = 1.
Thus i is the desired column of A.
It follows by Corollary 1 that Algorithm 3 finds a feasible solution λ′ ∈ R|N |≥0 to the covering
LP (4), and a set Q′I ⊆ QI of vectors (returned by F), such that λ′i > 0 only for i ∈ N ′, where
N ′ is the index set returned by oracle O′ and |N ′| ≤ s⌈ε−2 ln s⌉. Also Λ :=∑i∈N ′ λ′i ≤ (1 + 4ε).
Scaling λ′i by Λ, we obtain a set of multipliers {λi = λ′i/Λ : i ∈ N ′}, such that
∑
i∈N ′ λi = 1 and∑
i∈N ′
λix
i ≥ α
1 + 4ε
x∗.
We may assume xij = 0 for all j /∈ S+ whenever λi > 0; otherwise simply replace xi by a vector in
which all components not in S+ are set to zero. By the packing property this is possible. ⊓⊔
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Algorithm 1 Changing a dominating convex decomposition into an exact decomposition
Require: A packing convex set Q and point x∗ ∈ Q and a convex combination
∑
i∈N λix
i of integral
points in QI dominating x
∗.
Ensure: A convex decomposition x∗ =
∑
i∈N ′ λix
i with xi ∈ QI .
1: while ∆j :=
∑
i∈N λix
i − x∗j > 0 for some j do
2: let i be such that λix
i
j > 0 and ∆j > 0 for some j.
3: if there is a j such that λix
i
j > 0 and
∑
h∈N λhx
h − λi1j ≥ x
∗ then
4: replace xi by xi − 1j .
5: else
6: Among the indices j with xij > 0 and ∆j > 0, let k minimize ∆k/x
i
k.
7: let y be such that yj = x
i
j , if ∆j = 0, and yj = 0, if ∆j > 0.
8: change the lefthand side of (5) as follows: replace λi by λi −∆k/x
i
k and increase the coefficient
of y by ∆k/x
i
k.
9: end if
10: end while
2.3 From Dominating Convex Combination to Exact Convex Decomposition
We will show how to turn a dominating convex combination into an exact decomposition. The
construction is general and uses only the packing property. Such a construction seems to have
been observed in [LS05], but was not made explicit. Kraft, Fadaei, and Bichler [KFB14] describe
an alternative construction. Their construction may increase the size of the convex decomposition
(= number of non-zero λi) by a multiplicative factor s and an additive factor s
2. In contrast, our
construction increases the size only by an additive factor s.
Theorem 5. Let x∗ ∈ Q be dominated by a convex combination ∑i∈N λixi of integral points in
QI, i.e., ∑
i∈N
λix
i ≥ x∗. (5)
Then Algorithm 1 achieves equality in (5). It increases the size of the convex combination by at
most s, where s is the number of positive components of x∗.
Proof. Let S+ = {j : x∗j > 0}. We may assume xij = 0 for all j 6∈ S+ and all i ∈ N with λi > 0.
For j ∈ S+, let ∆j =
∑
i∈N λix
i
j − x∗j be the gap in the j-th component. If ∆j = 0 for all
j ∈ S+, we are done. Otherwise, choose j and i ∈ N such that ∆j > 0 and λixij > 0.
Let 1j be the j-th unit vector. If, for some j with x
i
j > 0 and ∆j > 0, replacing x
i by
xi − 1j maintains feasibility, i.e., satisfies constraint (5), we perform this replacement. Since xi is
an integer vector in QI , the vector xi − 1j is nonnegative and, by the packing property, in QI .
The replacement decreases ∆j by λi and does not increase the number of nonzero λi.
Otherwise, ∆j < λi for all j with ∆j > 0 and x
i
j > 0. Since x
i is integral, we also have
∆j ≤ λixij for all such j. Among the indices j with ∆j > 0 and xij > 0, let k minimize ∆k/xik.
Let y be such that yj = x
i
j if ∆j = 0 and yj = 0 if ∆j > 0. Then y ∈ QI since Q is a packing
polytope. In the convex combination, replace
λix
i by (λi − ∆k
xik
) · xi + ∆k
xik
· y.
Notice that λi − ∆kxi
k
≥ 0. Let ∆′j be the new gaps. Then clearly ∆′j = ∆j , if ∆j = 0. Consider any
j with ∆j > 0. Then
∆′j = ∆j −
∆k
xik
· xij =
{
0 if j = k
≥ (∆j − ∆jxi
j
) · xij = 0 if j 6= k.
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The inequality in the second case holds since ∆k/x
i
k ≤ ∆j/xij . We have decreased the number of
nonzero ∆j by one at the cost one additional nonzero λi. Thus the total number of vectors added
to the convex decomposition is at most s. ⊓⊔
2.4 Fast Convex Decomposition
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Theorem 4 yields a convex combination of integer points of QI dominating
αx∗/(1 + 4ε). The convex decomposition has size at most s⌈ǫ−2 ln s⌉, where s is the number of
positive entries of x∗. The algorithm makes at most s⌈ǫ−2 ln s⌉ calls to the integrality-gap verifier.
Theorem 5 turns this dominating convex combination into an exact combination. It adds up to s
additional vectors to the convex combination. ⊓⊔
3 Approximatly Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanisms
The goal of this section is to derive an approximate VCG-mechanism. We do not longer assume
that the fractional SWM-problem can be solved exactly, but instead assume that we have an
FPTAS for it. We will first design a randomized fractional algorithm (Theorem 6 in Subsection 3.1)
and then convert the fractional mechanism into an integral mechanism and prove Theorem 2 in
Subsection 3.2.
3.1 Approximately Truthful-in-Expectation Fractional Mechanisms
Theorem 6. Let ε0 ∈ (0, 1/2]. Define ε = Θ( ε
5
0
n4 ). Assuming that the fractional SWM-problem has
an FPTAS, is separable, and has a dominant allocation for every player i, there is a polynomial
time randomized fractional mechanism (Algorithm 2) with the following properties:
(D1) No positive transfer, i.e., prices are nonnegative.
(D2) Individually rational with probability 1− ε0, i.e., the utility of any truth-telling player is
non-negative with probability at least 1− ε0.
(D3) (1− ε0)-truthful-in-expectation, i.e., reporting the truth maximizes the expected utility of
a player up to a factor 1− ε0.
(D4) γ-socially efficient, where γ = (1− ε)(1− ε0).
In order to present Algorithm 2 and prove Theorem 6, we introduce some notation and prove
some preliminary Lemmas. Let
Li :=
∑
j 6=i
vj(u
j) and βi := εLi. (6)
Note that Li does not depend on the valuation of player i. Let A be an ε-approximation algorithm
for the LP relaxation of SWM. Note that A is polynomial time since the running time of an
FPTAS is polynomial in 1ε . We use A(v) to denote the outcome of A on input v; A(v) is a
fractional allocation in Q. In the following, we will apply A to different valuations which we
denote by v = (vi, v−i), v¯ = (v¯i, v−i), and v
′ = (0, v−i). Here vi is the reported valuation of player
i, v¯i is his true valuation and v
′
i = 0. We denote the allocation returned by A on input v (resp.,
v¯, v′) by x (resp., x¯, x′). Note that x, x¯, x′ are fractional allocations.
We first bound the maximal change in social welfare induced by a change of the valuation of
the i-th player.
Lemma 1. Let ε ≥ 0 and let A be an ε-approximation algorithm which returns allocation x on
input vector v. Let xˆ ∈ Q be an arbitrary point, then
v(x) ≥ v(xˆ)− βi − ε · vi(xˆ) (7)
for every i.
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Algorithm 2 The mechanism M of Theorem 6. The vectors ui are defined as in (1) and the
quantities Li are defined in (6). The definitions of q0, qj , active and inactive player are given in
the proof of Theorem 6.
Require: A valuation vector v, a packing convex set Q and an ε-approximation algorithm, where ε is as
Theorem 6.
Ensure: An allocation x ∈ Q and a payment p ∈ Rn satisfying (D1) to (D4).
1: Choose an index j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, where 0 is chosen with probability q0 and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} is chosen
with probability qj = (1− q0)/n.
2: if j = 0 then
3: Use ε-approximation algorithm A to compute an allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Q and compute
payments with payment rule (8). For all inactive i, change xi and pi to zero.
4: else
5: For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, set


xi = u
i, pi = η
′Li if i = j and i is active,
xi = u
i, pi = 0 if i = j and i is inactive,
xi = 0, pi = 0 if i 6= j.
6: end if
7: return (x, p)
Proof. We have
v(x) ≥ (1− ε)max
x∈Q
v(x)
≥ (1− ε)v(xˆ)
= v(xˆ)− ε ·
∑
j 6=i
vj(xˆ)− ε · vi(xˆ)
≥ v(xˆ)− βi − ε · vi(xˆ),
where the first inequality follows from the fact that A is an ε-approximation algorithm, and the
last inequality follows from ε
∑
j 6=i vj(xˆ) ≤ ε
∑
j 6=i vj(u
j) = βi. ⊓⊔
We use the following payment rule:
pi(v) := max{pVCGi (v)− βi, 0} (8)
where
pVCGi (v) := v−i(x
′)− v−i(x).
v−i(x) =
∑
j 6=i vj(x), x = A(v) and x′ = A(0, v−i). Observe the similarity in the definition of
pVCGi (v) to the VCG payment rule. In both cases, the payment is defined as the difference of
the total value of two allocations to the players different from i. The first allocation ignores the
influence of player i (x′ = A(0, v−i)) and the second allocation takes it into account (x = A(v)).
The difference to the VCG rule is that x′ and x are not true maximizers but are computed by an
ε-approximation algorithm.
Let Ui(v) = v¯i(x)− pi(v) be the utility of player i for bid vector v. Note that the value of the
allocation x = A(v) is evaluated with the true valuation v¯i of player i. Let Ui(v¯) = v¯i(x¯) − pi(v¯)
be the utility of player i for valuation vector v¯ = (v¯i, v−i).
Lemma 2. Let ε ≥ 0 and let A be an ε-approximation algorithm. Let M0 be the mechanism with
allocation function A(v) and the payment rule (8). M0 is an individually rational mechanism with
no positive transfer, such that for all i,
Ui(v¯) ≥ Ui(v)− ε · v¯i(x)− 3βi. (9)
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Proof. By definition, pi(v) ≥ 0 for all v and all x; so the mechanism has no positive transfer. We
next address individual rationality. Assume pi(v¯) = p
VCG
i (v¯)−βi > 0, as otherwise Ui(v¯) ≥ 0. We
have
Ui(v¯) = v¯i(x¯)− pi(v¯)
= v¯i(x¯)− pVCGi (v¯) + βi
= v¯i(x¯) + v¯−i(x¯)− v¯−i(x′) + βi
= v¯(x¯)− v¯(x′) + v¯i(x′) + βi
≥ (1− ε)v¯i(x′) ≥ 0,
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 1 with v = v¯ and xˆ = x′.
Finally, we prove (9). We have v′(x′) = v−i(x
′), v′(x) = v−i(x), and v
′
i(x) = 0. Thus,
pVCGi (v) = v−i(x
′)− v−i(x) = v′(x′)− v′(x) + ε · v′i(x)
Applying Lemma 1 for v = v′ and xˆ = x, we obtain
v′(x′)− v′(x) + ε · v′i(x) ≥ −βi
Therefore,
pVCGi (v) + βi ≥ 0. (10)
To see (9), we consider two cases:
Case 1: pi(v) = 0. Then using (10)
Ui(v¯) = v¯i(x¯)− 0 ≥ v¯i(x¯)− pVCGi (v¯)− βi.
Case 2: pi(v) = p
VCG
i (v)− βi.
Ui(v¯) = v¯i(x¯)− pi(v¯) = v¯i(x¯)− pVCGi (v¯) + βi ≥ v¯i(x¯)− pVCGi (v¯)− βi,
where the last inequality follows from βi ≥ 0. Therefore, in both cases we have:
Ui(v¯) ≥ v¯i(x¯)− pVCGi (v¯)− βi.
Now by using the definition of pVCGi and Lemma 1, we get
Ui(v¯) ≥ v¯i(x¯)− pVCGi (v¯)− βi
= v¯i(x¯) + v¯−i(x¯)− v¯−i(x′)− βi
= v¯(x¯)− v¯−i(x′)− βi
≥ v¯(x) − βi − εv¯i(x) − v¯−i(x′)− βi
= v¯i(x)− pVCGi (v) − εv¯i(x) − 2βi
≥ v¯i(x)− pi(v)− βi − εv¯i(x)− 2βi
= Ui(v)− εv¯i(x) − 3βi.
⊓⊔
In what follows we prove Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6. Define q0 = (1 − ε0n )n, ε¯ = ε0/2, and qj = (1 − q0)/n for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Let
η = ε¯(1 − q0)2/n3, η′ = η/qj , and ε = ηε¯(1 − q0)/(8n). Then using7 q0 = (1 − ε0n )n ≥ 1− ε0 and
q0 = (1− ε0n )n ≤ 1− ε0/2, we get
ε50
128n4
=
ε¯2(ε0/2)
3
8n4
≤ ε = ηε¯(1− q0)/(8n) = ε¯
2(1− q0)3
8n4
≤ ε¯
2ε30
8n4
=
ε50
16n4
,
7 Let f(x) = (1− x/n)n − 1 + x. Then f ′(x) = (1− x/n)n−1 + 1 ≥ 0. Hence, for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and n ≥ 1,
the function is increasing and f(x) ≥ f(0) = 0.
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as stated in the Theorem. Let Ui(v) = v¯i(x) − pi(v) be the utility of player i obtained by the
mechanism M0 of Lemma 2. Let further Ûi(v) = vi(x)−pi(v). Following [DRVY11], we call player
i active if the following two conditions hold:
Ûi(v) +
ε¯qi
q0
vi(u
i) ≥ qi
q0
η′Li, (11)
vi(u
i) ≥ ηLi. (12)
Note that these conditions do not depend on the true valuation v¯. We denote by T = T (v) the set
of active players when the valuation is v = (v1, . . . , vn). Note that Li does not depend on vi. Thus
when we refer to conditions (11) and (12) for v¯, we replace v and x by v¯ and x¯ on the left side
and keep the right side unchanged. Non-negativity of payments is immediate from the definition
of mechanism M and Lemma 2. Moreover, the utility of a truth-telling bidder i can be negative
only if he/she is allocated in step 5, i.e., at most with probability qi. It follows that the mechanism
is individually rational with probability at least 1−∑ni=1 qi = q0 = (1− ε0n )n ≥ 1− ε0.
Now we address truthfulness. Let us denote the expected utility of player i obtained from the
mechanism in Algorithm 2 on input v ∈ V by E[U ′i(v)]. Assume j = 0 in Algorithm 2. We run
ε-approximation algorithm A on v to compute allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn). Then we change xi and
pi to zero for all inactive i. Let x˜ be the allocation obtained in this way. The value for player i is
vi(x˜). When the i-th player is active, this value is equal to vi(x) because vi depends only on the
valuation in the i-th group (separability property). Therefore in this case his utility is Ui(v). So
we have that
E[U ′i(v)] =
{
q0 · Ui(v) + qi(v¯i(ui)− η′Li) if i ∈ T (v),
qiv¯i(u
i) if i 6∈ T (v). (13)
We first observe
E[U ′i(v¯)] ≥ (1− ε¯)qi · v¯i(ui). (14)
Indeed, the inequality is trivially satisfied if i 6∈ T (v¯). On the other hand, if i ∈ T (v¯), then (11)
implies Ui(v¯) = Ûi(v¯) ≥ qiq0
(
η′Li − ε¯v¯i(ui)
)
, therefore
E[U ′i(v¯)] = q0 · Ui(v¯) + qi(v¯i(ui)− η′Li)
≥ q0 · qi
q0
(
η′Li − ε¯v¯i(ui)
)
+ qi(v¯i(u
i)− η′Li)
= (1 − ε¯)qi · v¯i(ui).
We now consider four cases:
Case 1: i ∈ T (v¯) ∩ T (v). Note that (12) for v¯ implies βi = εLi ≤ εv¯i(u
i)
η . Thus, by Lemma 2, and
using assumption (1) that v¯i(x) ≤ v¯i(ui), we have
Ui(v¯) ≥ Ui(v)− ε(1 + 3
η
)v¯i(u
i) ≥ Ui(v)− 4ε
η
v¯i(u
i). (15)
Hence by using (13) and (15), we have
E[U ′i(v)] = q0 · Ui(v) + qi(v¯i(ui)− η′Li)
≤ q0(Ui(v¯) + 4ε
η
v¯i(u
i)) + qi(v¯i(u
i)− η′Li)
= q0Ui(v¯) + qi(v¯i(u
i)− η′Li)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[U ′
i
(v¯)]
+q0
4ε
η
v¯i(u
i)
= E[U ′i(v¯)] + q0
4ε
η
v¯i(u
i).
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Now applying (14) in the above inequality, we get
E[U ′i(v)] ≤ E[U ′i(v¯)] + q0
4ε
η
v¯i(u
i)
≤
(
1 +
q0
(1− ε¯)qi
4ε
η
)
E[U ′i(v¯)]
≤ (1 + ε¯)E[U ′i(v¯)],
where the last inequality follows from the definition of ε. Note that (since q0 ≤ 1 and ε¯ ≤ 1/2)
ε
q0
(1− ε¯)qi
4
η
≤ ε 1
(1− ε¯)qi
4
η
≤ ηε¯(1− q0)
8n
8
qiη
= ε¯.
Case 2: i 6∈ T (v). By (14), we have
E[U ′i(v)] = qiv¯i(u
i) ≤ 1
1− ε¯E[U
′
i(v¯)] ≤ (1 + ε0)E[U ′i(v¯)].
Since, 11−ε¯ = 1 + ε¯(1 + ε¯+ ε¯
2 + . . .) ≤ 1 + 2ε¯ = 1 + ε0.
Case 3: i ∈ T (v) \ T (v¯) and (12) does not hold for v¯. Since Ui(v) ≤ v¯i(ui), we have
E[U ′i(v)] = q0 · Ui(v) + qi(v¯i(ui)− η′Li) ≤ (q0 + qi)v¯i(ui)− qiη′Li < (q0 + qi − 1)v¯i(ui)
≤ 0 ≤ qiv¯i(ui) = E[U ′i(v¯)],
where the second inequality holds because (12) does not hold for v¯ and qiη
′/η = 1.
Case 4: i ∈ T (v) \ T (v¯) and (12) holds for v¯. Then (11) does not hold for v¯ and hence
Ui(v¯) = Ûi(v¯) <
qi
q0
(
η′Li − ε¯v¯i(ui)
)
. (16)
Since (12) holds for v¯, we have (15). Hence by (14), (15) and (16) we have
E[U ′i(v)] = q0 · Ui(v) + qi(v¯i(ui)− η′Li)
≤ q0
(
Ui(v¯) +
4ε
η
v¯i(u
i)
)
+ qi(v¯i(u
i)− η′Li)
≤ qiη′Li − qiε¯v¯i(ui) + 4ε
η
v¯i(u
i) + qi(v¯i(u
i)− η′Li)
= (1− ε¯)qi · v¯i(ui) + 4ε
η
v¯i(u
i)
≤
(
1 +
1
(1 − ε¯)qi
4ε
η
)
E[U ′i(v¯)]
≤ (1 + ε¯)E[U ′i(v¯)],
where the last inequality follows from the definition of ε (see Case 1).
We finally argue about the approximation ratio. Note that for i 6∈ T (v), one of the in-
equalities (11) or (12) does not hold. Also, Ui(v) ≥ 0 in this case since pi = 0, and hence
vi(u
i) < max{η, η′/ε¯}Li = η′Li/ε¯. Since A returns allocation x that is (1 − ε)-social efficiency
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and8 qi − q0nη
′
ε¯ ≥ 0, it follows that for any v ∈ V , (recall x = A(v))
E[v(x˜)] = q0
∑
i∈T (v)
vi(x) +
∑
i∈[n]
qivi(u
i)
= q0
∑
i∈[n]
vi(x)− q0
∑
i/∈T (v)
vi(x) +
∑
i∈[n]
qivi(u
i)
= q0v(x) − q0
∑
i/∈T (v)
vi(u
i) +
∑
i∈[n]
qivi(u
i)
> q0v(x) − q0 η
′
ε¯
∑
i6∈T (v)
Li +
∑
i∈[n]
qivi(u
i)
= q0v(x) − q0 η
′
ε¯
∑
i6∈T (v)
∑
j 6=i
vj(u
j) +
∑
i∈[n]
qivi(u
i)
≥ q0v(x) − q0 η
′
ε¯
n
∑
j∈[n]
vj(u
j) +
∑
i∈[n]
qivi(u
i)
≥ q0v(x) +
∑
i∈[n]
(
qi − q0nη
′
ε¯
)
vi(u
i)
≥ q0(1− ε) ·max
z∈Q
v(z)
≥ (1− ε0)(1 − ε) ·max
z∈Q
v(z).
⊓⊔
3.2 Approximately Truthful-in-Expectation Integral Mechanisms
In this subsection, we derive a randomized mechanism M ′ which returns an integral allocation.
Let ε > 0 be arbitrary. First run Algorithm 2 to obtain x and p(v). Then compute a convex
decomposition of α1+4εx, which is
α
1+4εx =
∑
j∈N λ
x
j x
j . Finally with probability λxj (we use the
superscript x to distinguish the convex decompositions of different x) return the allocation xj
and charge the i-th player the price pi(v)
vi(x
j)
vi(x)
, if vi(x) > 0, and zero otherwise. We now prove
Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let M be a fractional randomized mechanism obtained in Theorem 6. Since
M has no positive transfer, M ′ does neither. M is individually rational with probability 1 − ε0,
therefore for any allocation x¯, we have v¯i(x¯)− pi(v¯) ≥ 0 with probability 1− ε0. So
v¯i(x
l)− pi(v¯) v¯i(x
l)
v¯i(x¯)
= (v¯i(x¯)− pi(v¯)) v¯i(x
l)
v¯i(x¯)
≥ 0,
hence M ′ is individually rational with probability 1−ε0. Now we prove truthfulness. Let E[U ′′i (v¯)]
be the expected utility of player i when she inputs her true valuation and let E[U
′′
i (v)] be her
8 q0n
η′
ε¯
≤ nη
qi ε¯
= n
2 ε¯(1−q0)
2
(1−q0)ε¯n3
= 1−q0
n
= qi.
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expected utility when she inputs vi. Then by definition of E[U
′′
i (v¯)], we have
E[U
′′
i (v¯)] = Ex¯∼M(v¯)
[∑
l∈N
λx¯l
(
v¯i(x
l)− pi(v¯) v¯i(x
l)
v¯i(x¯)
)]
= Ex¯∼M(v¯)
[(
v¯i(
∑
l∈N
λx¯l x
l)− pi(v¯)
v¯i(
∑
l∈N λ
x¯
l x
l)
v¯i(x¯)
)]
= Ex¯∼M(v¯)[
α
1 + 4ε
v¯i(x¯)− α
1 + 4ε
pi(v¯)]
=
α
1 + 4ε
Ex¯∼M(v¯)[v¯i(x¯)− pi(v¯)]
=
α
1 + 4ε
E[U ′(v¯)]
≥ (1− ε0) α
1 + 4ε
E[U ′(v)]
= (1− ε0) α
1 + 4ε
Ex∼M(v)[v¯(x)− pi(v)]
= (1− ε0)Ex∼M(v)[ α
1 + 4ε
v¯(x)− pi(v) α
1 + 4ε
· vi(x)
vi(x)
]
= (1− ε0)E
[∑
l∈N
λxl
(
v¯i(x
l)− pi(v)vi(x
l)
vi(x)
)]
= (1− ε0)E[U ′i (v)].
Taking expectation with respect to x shows that the mechanism is α(1−ε0)(1−ε)1+4ε -socially efficient.
E[v(x )] = Ex∼M(v)
[∑
l∈N
λxl v(x
l)
]
= Ex∼M(v)
[
v(
∑
l∈N
λxl x
l)
]
= Ex∼M(v)
[
v(
α
1 + 4ε
x)
]
=
α
1 + 4ε
Ex∼M(v)[v(x)] ≥ α
1 + 4ε
(1− ε0)(1 − ε)max
z∈Q
v(z).
This completes the proof of Theorem 2. ⊓⊔
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Appendix I: Khandekar’s Algorithm for Covering Linear Programs
Consider a covering linear program:
min cTx subject to Ax ≥ b, x ≥ 0, (17)
where A ∈ Rm×n≥0 is an m × n matrix with non-negative entries and c ∈ Rn≥0 and b ∈ Rm≥0 are
non-negative vectors. We assume the availability of a κ-approximation oracle for some κ ∈ (0, 1].
Oκ(z): Given z ∈ Rm≥0, the oracle finds a column j of A that maximizes 1cj
∑m
i=1
ziaij
bi
within a
factor of κ:
1
cj
m∑
i=1
ziaij
bi
≥ κ · max
j′∈[n]
1
cj′
m∑
i=1
ziaij′
bi
(18)
We use Ai to denote the i-th row of A. Algorithm 3 constructs vectors x(t) ∈ Rn≥0, for t =
0, 1, . . . , untilM(t) := mini∈[m]Aix(t)/bi becomes at least T :=
lnm
ε2 . Define the active list at time
t by L(t) := {i ∈ [m] : Aix(t − 1)/bi < T }. For i ∈ L(t), define
pi(t) := (1− ε)Aix(t−1)/bi , (19)
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Algorithm 3 Covering(Oκ)
Require: a covering system (A, b, c) given by a κ−approximation oracle Oκ, where A ∈ R
m×n
≥0 , b ∈ R
m
>0,
c ∈ Rn>0, and an accuracy parameter ε ∈ (0, 1/2]
Ensure: A feasible solution xˆ ∈ Rn≥0 to (2) s.t. c
T xˆ ≤ (1+4ε)
κ
z∗
1: x(0) := 0; t := 0; and T := lnm
ε2
2: while M(t) < T do
3: t := t+ 1
4: Let j(t) := Oκ(p(t)/‖p(t)‖1)
5: xj(t)(t) := xj(t)(t− 1) + δ(t) and xj(t) = xj(t− 1) for j 6= j(t)
6: end while
7: return xˆ = x(t)
M(t)
and set pi(t) = 0 for i 6∈ L(t). At each time t, the algorithm calls the oracle with the vector
zt = p(t)/‖p(t)‖1, and increases the variable xj(t) by
δ(t) := min
i∈L(t) and ai,j(t) 6=0
bi
ai,j(t)
, (20)
where j(t) is the index returned by the oracle.
Proof of Theorem 3. Note that the RHS of (18) is positive for our choice of zt since every row
of A contains a non-zero entry and hence
∑
i∈L(t) pi(t)aij(t)/(bicj(t)) > 0. This conclude that there
exist at least one i ∈ L(t) which ai,j(t) is non zero and thus δ(t) > 0 always. In each iteration, some
entry of x is increased and hence the values Aix(t)/bi are non-decreasing. Thus L(t + 1) ⊆ L(t)
for all t. At the end, we scale x(t) by M(t) to guarantee feasibility.
Let 1j denote the j-th unit vector of dimension n and B ∈ Rm×m be a diagonal matrix
with entries bii = bi. Feasibility is obvious since we scale by M(t). The bound on the number of
iterations is also obvious since in each iteration at least one of the Aix/bi increases by one and we
remove i from the active list once Aix/bi reaches T . We conclude that the number of iterations
is bounded by m⌈T ⌉. Let t0 be the number of iterations, i.e., vectors x(0), x(1), . . . , x(t0) are
defined and M(t0 − 1) < T ≤ M(t0). In the t-th iteration exactly one entry of x is increased by
δ(t) and hence 1Tx(t0) =
∑
1≤t≤t0
δ(t) and Aix(t)/bi ≤ Aix(t − 1)/bi + 1 for i ∈ L(t). To show
(3), we analyze the decrease of ‖p(t)‖1. Let t ≤ t0. Then
∑
i∈L(t)
(1− ε)Aix(t)/bi =
∑
i∈L(t)
(1− ε)Aix(t−1)/bi+δ(t)Ai1j(t)/bi
=
∑
i∈L(t)
pi(t)(1 − ε)δ(t)Ai1j(t)/bi
≤
∑
i∈L(t)
pi(t)(1 − εδ(t)Ai1j(t)/bi)
(using (20) conclude that δ(t)Ai1j(t)/bi ≤ 1 and
(1− ε)x ≤ 1− εx for all ε ∈ [0, 1), x ∈ [0, 1])
= ‖p(t)‖1
(
1− εδ(t)p(t)
TB−1A1j(t)
‖p(t)‖1
)
≤ ‖p(t)‖1e−εδ(t)
p(t)T
‖p(t)‖1
B−1A1j(t) since 1− x ≤ e−x. (21)
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By using L(t+ 1) ⊆ L(t), we have
‖p(t+ 1)‖1 =
∑
i∈L(t+1)
(1− ε)Aix(t)/bi
≤
∑
i∈L(t)
(1− ε)Aix(t)/bi (22)
and hence applying inequalities (21) and (22) we get,
‖p(t+ 1)‖1 ≤
∑
i∈L(t)
(1− ε)Aix(t)/bi ≤ ‖p(t)‖1e−εδ(t)
p(t)T
‖p(t)‖1
B−1A1j(t) . (23)
Let i0 ∈ L(t0) be arbitrary. Then
(1− ε)Ai0x(t0)/bi0 ≤
∑
i∈L(t0)
(1− ε)Aix(t0)/bi0
≤ ‖p(t0)‖1e−εδ(t0)
p(t0)
T
‖p(t0)‖1
B−1A1j(t0)
≤ ‖p(0)‖1e−ε
∑
1≤t≤t0
δ(t)
p(t)T
‖p(t)‖1
B−1A1j(t) ,
where the second inequality uses (21) for t = t0 and the third inequality uses (23) for 0 ≤ t < t0.
Taking logs and using ‖p(0)‖1 = m, we conclude that
Ai0x(t0)/bi0 · ln(1− ε) ≤ lnm− ε
∑
1≤t≤t0
δ(t)
p(t)T
‖p(t)‖1B
−1A1j(t) (24)
We next relate the objective value cTx(t0) =
∑
1≤t≤t0
cj(t)δ(t) at time t0 to the optimal value z
∗
by the following claim.
Claim.
∑
1≤t≤t0
δ(t) p(t)
T
‖p(t)‖1
B−1A1j(t) ≥ κ·c
T x(t0)
z∗ .
Proof. Let x∗ ∈ Rn≥0 be an optimal solution to (2). Since x∗ is feasible, B−1Ax∗ ≥ 1, and thus for
any t,
p(t)TB−1Ax∗ ≥ p(t)T1 = ‖p(t)‖1.
By the choice of the index j(t), we have that 1cj(t) p(t)
TB−1A1j(t) ≥ 1cj κp(t)TB−1A1j for all
j ∈ [n]. Since z∗ = cTx∗, we conclude further
z∗p(t)TB−1A1j(t) =
∑
j∈[n]
cjx
∗
jp(t)
TB−1A1j(t)
=
∑
j∈[n]
cj ·
cj(t)
cj(t)
x∗jp(t)
TB−1A1j(t)
≥
∑
j∈[n]
cj ·
cj(t)
cj
x∗jκp(t)
TB−1A1j
= κcj(t)p(t)
TB−1Ax∗
≥ κcj(t)‖p(t)‖1.
Multiplying both sides of this inequality by δ(t)/‖p(t)‖1 and summing up over 1 ≤ t ≤ t0 finishes
the proof of the claim. ⊓⊔
Using the claim above, we deduce from (24)
Ai0x(t0)/bi0 · ln(1 − ε) ≤ lnm− ε ·
κ · cTx(t0)
z∗
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Dividing both sides by M(t0), arranging, and using M(t0) ≥ T = (lnm)/ε2, Ai0x(t0)/bi0 ≤
Ai0x(t0 − 1)/bi0 + 1 ≤ T + 1, and ln
1
1−ε
ε ≤ 1 + 2ε, valid for all ε ∈ (0, 12 ], we obtain
κ · cT xˆ
z∗
=
κ · cTx(t0)
M(t0)z∗
≤ ln
1
1−ε
ε
· Ai0x(t0)/bi0
M(t0)
+
lnm
ε ·M(t0)
≤ (1 + 2ε)T + 1
T
+ ε ≤ 1 + 4ε.
⊓⊔
Proof of Corollary 1. Recall (24):
Ai0x(t0)/bi0 · ln(1− ε) ≤ lnm− ε
∑
1≤t≤t0
δ(t)
p(t)T
‖p(t)‖1B
−1A1j(t).
With assumption b = 1, we have,
Ai0x(t0) · ln(1− ε) ≤ lnm− ε
∑
1≤t≤t0
δ(t)
p(t)T
‖p(t)‖1A1j(t).
The vector zt = p(t)/‖p(t)‖1 satisfies 1T zt = 1. Apply oracle O′ with input vector zt, it returns
index j(t) such that we have p(t)
T
‖p(t)‖1
A1j(t) ≥ 1. Thus, we have
Ai0x(t0) · ln(1− ε) ≤ lnm− ε · 1Tx(t0).
Proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 3, we get the result. ⊓⊔
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